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The Great War began in August 1914 as a war of movement, but after three months of 
maneuver battles the conflict assumed a different 
form on the Western Front. As flanks were closed 
during the “race” to the sea, opposing lines of 
armies began to solidify into static positions. 
The quick resolution that many contemporary 
observers had imagined would settle the war 
before Christmas was nowhere in sight, and 
with the onset of winter, there was little activity 
in the west. In the meantime the Germans won 
significant victories on the Eastern Front, but 
with the return of campaigning weather in the 
spring of 1915, their attention returned to the 
situation in France and Belgium. In order to 
divert attention away from troop movements 
to the east, the German command decided to 
launch a limited offensive to reduce the Ypres 
Salient in April 1915. This was not intended as 
a war-winning attack, but it presented a double 
opportunity to test new chemical weapons 
and keep the Allies on the defensive. While the 
Germans were eager to reduce the Salient, the 
Allies were equally determined to defend it. Ypres 
was one of few Belgian towns that remained 
unoccupied and it had become an important 
symbol of Allied resistance since the First Battle 
of Ypres in 1914. It was also a gateway to the 
channel ports and the British were not prepared 
to let these fall into German hands.
The Second Battle of Ypres is widely remembered 
as the debut for chlorine gas on the Western Front, 
but it was also the introduction to pitched battle 
for the officers and men of the First Canadian 
Contingent. From the Allied and Canadian 
perspectives, Second Ypres was a difficult fight 
not only due to the presence of chemical agents 
on the battlefield, but because British, French 
and Canadian troops were reacting to a German 
initiative. Such circumstances must have made 
those April days especially chaotic for Canada’s 
largely untested soldiers. It is now recognized 
that the Germans lacked the local resources 
necessary to sustain a breakthrough at Ypres 
in the wake of their 22 April attack, but Allied 
commanders operating without the benefits of 
hindsight interpreted the enemy’s advance as 
a palpable threat to the security of the Salient. 
The first German gas cloud was directed against 
French troops who occupied the northeastern 
edge of the Salient. The defenders, who were not 
equipped with respirators, fell into disorder as 
choking men attempted to escape the greenish-
yellow gas cloud. To the immediate right of the 
French, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades 
fought desperately to prevent the Germans from 
encircling the Allied line. Meanwhile, a polyglot 
of Allied units rushed forward to close the gap 
left by French troops who were driven back by 
the initial gas attack. Many of the fresh British 
and Dominion formations thrown into a series 
of counterattacks during the following few days 
would suffer appalling casualties, not from the 
gas itself, but from conventional small-arms and 
artillery fire.1 
During the night of 22-23 April, 1st Canadian 
Infantry Brigade marched out of its reserve billets 
to help deal with the crisis at the front. In the 
dawn hours of 23 April a counterattack by 1st 
and 4th Infantry Battalions was launched against 
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6new German positions established along the east-
west line of Mauser Ridge. The attack, designed to 
stabilize the front, lasted for most of the daylight 
hours of 23 April. Upon first examination it seems 
to conform to the stereotype of “unprepared” 
Canadians being thrown haphazardly into 
hopeless battle that is so often associated 
with the earlier war years. Standard historical 
interpretations of the Canadians’ participation at 
the Second Battle of Ypres argue that inadequate 
and incomplete training were chiefly responsible 
for high Canadian casualties and loss of ground. 
Military historian Desmond Morton has noted 
that “serious training” for the Canadians 
prior to Second Ypres was limited by weather, 
leave, sickness and a shortage of instructors.2 
Historian Bill Rawling, in his landmark study of 
trench warfare, contends that in early 1915 “the 
Canadians were not yet ready for the kind of war 
that had been thrust upon them.”3 There is some 
truth to these statements, but they do not sum 
up the first few months of the war with complete 
accuracy. A careful examination of the evidence 
suggests that, notwithstanding the unfavourable 
circumstances referred to by Morton, the officers 
and men of the 1st Canadian Contingent learned 
a great deal about warfare during the months they 
spent training in England and France between 
October 1914 and March 1915. 
Upon arriving in England in late October 1914 
a standard training syllabus was prepared 
for Canadians to follow.4 This training was 
supplemented in France when Canadian 
companies and battalions were paired off with 
more experienced British units during rotations 
through quiet sectors of the front. Special 
attention was devoted to the preparation of 
defensive positions in the dark, the crossing of 
wire obstacles, cooperation of all arms in the 
attack, and resupply in the field.5 Prior to leaving 
England for France, 1st Brigade participated 
in several days of brigade-level maneuvers that 
involved scenarios not dissimilar to the real-life 
situation that 1st and 4th Battalions would find 
themselves in on 23 April.6 Overall, the training 
undertaken by the Canadians prior to their 
first major battle was quite sophisticated and 
not simply a matter of squad drill and bayonet 
practice.
B e y o n d  r o u t i n e 
drill and exercises, 
Canad i ans  we r e 
privy to the latest 
lessons from the 
front through the 
pamphle ts  and 
manuals that were 
being produced 
by Captain S.G. 
P a r t r i d g e ’ s 
Br i t i sh  Army 
Pr in t ing  and 
S t a t i o n a r y 
D e p o t  i n 
ever greater 
n u m b e r s . 7 
Left: Lieutenant-Colonel A.P. Birchall, commanding 
officer of the 4th Battalion from 29 January 1915 until 
his death on 23 April.
Inset: A cap badge of the 4th Canadian Infantry 
Battalion (Central Ontario).
Below: Birchall’s training manual, Rapid Training of a 
Company for War.  This is the third edition, printed in 
March 1915.
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7Visiting British officers also arrived in the 
Canadian camp to give lectures and answer 
questions about the situation in France and 
Belgium.8 Some of these officers stayed on 
permanently with the Canadians. One of them 
was Captain A.P. Birchall, a veteran officer 
with 14 years in the British Army’s 7th Royal 
Fusiliers.9 Birchall was subsequently promoted 
and assigned to command 4th Canadian Battalion 
as of 29 January 1915.10 He was not only an 
experienced officer, but also the author of Rapid 
Training of Company for War, an instructional 
manual reprinted three times during 1915.11 
There is no question that the counterattack of 
23 April was extremely costly for 1st and 4th 
Battalions; 1st Battalion suffered more than 400 
casualties and 4th Battalion lost approximately 
500 men.12 Although neither unit was able to 
capture its terrain objective on 23 April, the 
counterattack was successful in the sense that it 
helped to prevent the Germans from advancing 
on Ypres and cutting off the Salient. Contrary 
to the standard interpretation, there is little 
evidence to suggest that insufficient training 
caused high numbers of casualties or unduly 
influenced the outcome of the counterattack. 
Contemporary sources clearly show that 1st 
and 4th Canadian battalions displayed a great 
deal of skill in their first major battle. A careful 
examination of message logs, after action reports, 
and eyewitness accounts recorded at the time 
indicates that the two battalions remained 
in communication with each other, and with 
higher level formations (brigade and division), 
throughout the day. During their ordeal on the 
battlefield, both battalions continued to function 
under extreme fire according to their training 
and, despite many officer casualties, including 
the 4th Battalion’s commander, the troops did 
not fall into disarray or quit the field in disorder. 
Both units held their positions as best they could 
until relieved late on the 23rd. Officers at brigade 
and division headquarters attempted to secure 
as much support as possible from neighbouring 
infantry and artillery units. 
When the Germans launched their first gas 
clouds on 22 April, Brigadier M.S. Mercer’s 1st 
Canadian Brigade was in reserve at Vlamertinghe, 
about five miles to the west of Ypres. During the 
night of 22-23 April, Generals H.C.O. Plumer, (5th 
British Corps) and E.A.H. Alderson (Canadian 
Division) decided that 1st Canadian Brigade, 
specifically 1st and 4th Canadian Battalions, 
would participate in an Allied counterattack 
against the newly-established German line along 
Mauser Ridge, which ran roughly west to east 
on the northern edge of the shrinking Salient. 
Both battalions were warned for action during 
the evening of 22 April. As a result of the initial 
German attack, French troops suffering the effects 
of chlorine gas were falling back on Vlamertinghe 
itself, along the very roads upon which 1st and 
4th Battalions would march in order to reach 
their starting lines for the counterattack.13 The 
battalions moved out of reserve after midnight 
and crossed over the Yser Canal on the Brielen 
Bridge sometime between 0315 and 0410 
hours.14 Good route march discipline probably 
saved the Canadians from becoming hopelessly 
entangled with retreating French soldiers and 
various other bodies of troops heading one way 
or another. Shortly after crossing the canal the 
commanding officers of 1st and 4th Battalions 
Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Hill, commanding officer of 
the 1st Canadian Infantry Battalion in April 1915.  He 
is shown here later in the war as a Brigader-General in 
command of 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
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8were briefed by Brigadier Mercer.15 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.P. Birchall (4th Battalion) 
and Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Hill (1st Battalion) 
were notified at 0443 hours on the morning 
of 23 April that two French battalions on their 
left flank would be launching a counterattack 
toward Pilckem at 0500 hours. On the Canadian 
front 4th Battalion would lead the assault with 
1st Battalion in support. A single battery of 1st 
Canadian Field Artillery (CFA) Brigade was to 
fire in support of the Canadian battalions from a 
position west of the Yser canal.16 The Canadians’ 
objective was the German line atop Mauser Ridge, 
1,500 yards from the Canadian starting line. The 
intervening space was largely open ground, with 
a single line of hedges and willow trees bisecting 
the area about halfway between the Canadian and 
German positions.17 The field sloped upward very 
gradually to the top of the ridge line upon which 
the Germans were dug in. 
As of 0500 hours neither the French nor the 
Canadian battalions had yet to move. The 
reason for the French delay is unknown, but 
4th Battalion’s axis of advance was temporarily 
blocked by the Middlesex Regiment. At 0550 
hours Mercer’s 1st Brigade reported to Alderson’s 
headquarters that 4th Battalion would be passing 
through the Middlesex Regiment in order to join 
the French in the attack, which had still not 
begun. Believing that the French were prepared 
to attack on his left, Birchall launched his assault 
sometime between 0550 and 0630 hours.18 1st 
CFA was kept abreast of the battalions’ progress 
through messages from 1st Brigade since it was 
unlikely that the gunners would have been able 
Above: The scene of the initial German gas 
attack.  This photograph was probably taken 
shortly after the war.
Right: This photo, taken by the author in 2001, 
looks northeastwards across the battlefield 
from the Ypres-Pilckem Road.  Mauser Ridge 
is visible along the horizon, although the 
upward slope of the land is barely discernable. 
An extension of the A19 highway towards 
Ostend will soon bisect this area, which has 
otherwise changed very little since the Great 
War.
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9to clearly observe the attack from their positions 
on the opposite side of the Yser.19 No mention 
is made in the sources of forward observation 
officers being with the infantry battalions. 
Instead, it appears that supporting fire was 
requested by the battalion commanders through 
their brigade headquarters, which in turn were 
in contact with the CFA. 
At 0700 hours Lieutenant-Colonel Hill reported to 
brigade that 4th Battalion was not in touch with 
the French battalions that were supposed to be 
advancing on the Canadian left. The Canadians’ 
right flank was in better shape, as a company-
sized force from the Middlesex Regiment was also 
advancing.20 Within approximately 30 minutes 
Birchall’s troops had managed to cover roughly 
half of the distance toward the German trenches 
on top of the Mauser Ridge and Hill felt confident 
enough to report to brigade that “all goes well 
so far.”21 This early optimism may have resulted 
because the Germans held their fire until the 
Canadians were within 600 yards of them; 
shortly after Hill’s message was received, Birchall 
reported that progress was slow and that the 
enemy rifle fire was heavy.22 Hill then indicated 
to brigade that Birchall requested reinforcements 
and, accordingly, 1st Battalion was ordered to 
advance to support 4th Battalion.23 By the time 
that Hill’s message was received, brigade had 
already signaled division that 4th Battalion was 
stalled and had not established contact with 
the French.24 At 0820 hours brigade requested 
“urgent” artillery support for 4th Battalion, which 
had clearly been pinned down by then.25 In the 
absence of a French advance, division ordered 
brigade to dig in next to the British on its right 
and extend its line all the way to the canal line on 
the left, an additional distance of nearly one mile. 
The two Canadian battalions were expected to 
fill the French vacuum between the Pilckem road 
and the Yser.26 But as a result of heavy fighting 
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since daybreak, Birchall and Hill’s troops were 
not strong enough to extend themselves leftwards 
all the way to the canal line. Thus, Birchall 
dispatched the following message, received by 
brigade at 1050 hours:
Your message instructing us to stop advance 
and dig in received. Whole line is now digging 
in. Line extends from YPRES-PILKEM Road to I 
think about 600 yds. East of road. Casualties are 
heavy. MIDDLESEX are on our right and I do not 
know exactly how far they extend. We reached a 
point about 450x from German Trenches As all 
my companies are up in line and I cannot well 
move them to a flank in daylight I cannot extend 
our road (line?) towards Canal unless absolutely 
necessary. I am trying to find out situation 
between road and canal. Have sent a message to 
O.C. 1st Bn. giving your message and requesting 
him to extend his line to the left of the road.27 
 When Lieutenant-Colonel Hill learned of the 
open left flank he reported that only 100 men 
from his company were available as reserves, an 
entirely inadequate number to fill the gap left by 
the French. Hill wisely dug in his reserve troops 
toward the rear on a higher piece of ground from 
which he could cover some of the gap and protect 
the exposed Canadian left flank.28 Meanwhile, 
Birchall ordered his men to dig in where they 
were. A letter written by Captain Colquhoun, 
of “B” Company, 4th Battalion, indicates that 
the order was received by the forward troops, 
noting that “we advanced to within 400 yards of 
the Germans, when I received orders to go no 
further until I received reinforcements. I had only 
about half of my company left then.”29 Casualties 
tapered off once the troops were dug in opposite 
the Germans.
 The problem of the open flank was apparently 
solved just after 1100 hours when brigade 
informed the Canadian 
battalions that the French 
“now have five battalions 
between you and the 
canal...”30 However, it 
seems that the French 
were well to the rear of 
Canadian firing line, since 
Birchall was still having 
difficulty linking up them.31 
As a consequence, General 
Alderson attempted to 
c o n t a c t  t h e  Fr e n c h 
headquarters requesting 
that they advance to join 
up with the Canadian left 
flank.32 It is unknown how 
the French responded to 
this message, but by 1215 
hours Birchall had finally 
established contact with 
them and learned that 
despite earlier reports of 
five French battalions being 
available, only 50 men 
were present to fill the gap 
between the Pilckem Road 
and the Yser.33 Then, for 
reasons that are unclear, 
the French headquarters 
informed 1st Canadian 
Division that the Germans 
were “apparently running 
short of ammunition.”34 
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It was agreed that the Canadians and French 
would resume their attack at the soonest possible 
opportunity, although it is difficult to explain why 
Canadian or French commanders believed that 
the Germans were low on ammunition. If the 
German fire died down, it was probably because 
the Canadians had dug in and were presenting 
fewer targets than they had during the initial 
advance. In any case, the attack did not resume 
immediately, as the Canadians waited for a cue 
from the French which did not materialize before 
1500 hours.35
 The detailed message record ends at this 
point, but the battalion war diaries and eyewitness 
accounts of 4th Battalion soldiers indicate that 
the Canadians did resume their attack during 
the afternoon. An after-action report from 1st 
Battalion states that at 1545 hours, Colonel A.D. 
Geddes’ Buffs (East Kent Regiment) arrived and 
joined the Canadian survivors in a fresh assault. 
The Anglo-Canadian force was accompanied by 
a French attack of undetermined strength on 
the left. The 4th Battalion war diary reports that 
prior to the second attack, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Birchall took command of “C” Company after 
its commander had been wounded. The second 
attack succeeded in capturing a further 200 yards 
before being halted by withering fire. At some 
point during this final attempt to reach the enemy 
trench Lieutenant-Colonel Birchall was killed,36 
but the additional ground was held until later in 
the evening when the Canadians were relieved 
and withdrawn.37 Interestingly, an account from 
the London Times corroborates this narrative, 
although in highly compressed and stylized form:
It is safe to say that the youngest private in 
the rank, as he set his teeth for the advance, 
knew the task in front of him, and the youngest 
subaltern knew that all rested upon its success. 
It did not seem that any human being could live 
in the shower of shot and shell which began to 
play upon the advancing troops.
4th Canadian Battalion at one moment came 
under a particularly withering fire. For a 
moment--not more--it wavered. Its most gallant 
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Birchall, 
carrying, after an old fashion, a light cane, coolly 
and cheerfully rallied his men, and at the very 
moment when his example had infected them, 
fell dead at the head of his battalion.38
The first paragraph of the Times report refers to 
the initial phase of the attack, before the battalion 
“wavered” and dug in at a range of 400 yards 
from the crest of the ridge. The second paragraph 
describes the resumed Anglo-Canadian-French 
attack in which Birchall lost his life while leading 
“C” Company.
 Some of the 4th Battalion survivors insisted 
that the objective was reached within two hours 
of launching the original dawn attack. These 
accounts present some difficulty, since it is 
abundantly clear from official sources that the 
objective was never reached. In all likelihood the 
troops were not referring to the final objective, 
Charge of the 4th Canadian Battalion at Ypres - Lieutenant-Colonel Birchall
killed while leading his men as illustrated in The Times History of the War.
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but rather, to German outpost lines which were 
quickly overwhelmed under the weight of the 
initial assault. Consider the following account 
from Private A.W. Wakeling, of “B” Company, 4th 
Battalion:
At 5 a.m. we were told to take a trench about 
1,500 yards away. We had been lying down 
behind a hedge, and we no sooner showed 
ourselves than a terrible fire was opened up, 
machine gun, rifle and shrapnel. It came from all 
directions on our front and both flanks; our boys 
went over in dozens...It took us just one hour to 
take the trench the French had lost. Only 250 of 
us were left and five officers. We lost about 700 
men and 20 officers that morning...In my platoon 
55 started and only 11 of us reached the trench.39
In the first place, Wakeling has overestimated 
the casualties suffered by his battalion. In 4th 
Battalion there were 18 officer casualties, while 
487 other ranks were killed, wounded, or listed 
as missing.40 It is also likely that German fire 
did not reach a crescendo until the Canadians 
advanced to a closer range, probably within 1,000 
yards of the objective. This would explain why Hill 
observed an initially smooth advance. Finally, the 
trench to which Wakeling refers was not the main 
objective, but more probably, a forward outpost 
that the Germans quickly evacuated under the 
weight of the Canadian attack.41 Wakeling further 
explains that,
The worst was yet to come during the day. We 
had no artillery behind us and we had to hold the 
trench at all costs. The artillery started shelling 
us right away to drive us out...Towards evening 
our artillery came into action and reinforcements 
from the British Army...”42
In fact, one battery of Canadian artillery was in 
action throughout the day, but the men in the 
ranks hardly would have noticed this modest 
level of fire support in the midst of the punishing 
volume of German artillery that was landing 
on top of them. The friendly artillery to which 
Wakeling refers as “coming into action” was 
probably British or French. His last assertion 
regarding reinforcements is correct and refers 
to those arriving to support the second phase of 
the attack.
 Under the circumstances, there is little that 
the officers and men of 1st and 4th Battalions 
could have done differently from a tactical 
standpoint to make the counterattack against 
Mauser Ridge more successful. According to 
A.F. Duguid’s account in the official history, the 
initial advance was “carried out in the most 
perfect order,” as the respective companies “leap-
In this 1917 photo a Canadian soldier examines the grave marker of sapper
from 1st Field Company, Canadian Engineers who was killed at Second Ypres.
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frogged” toward their objectives during the early 
morning hours of 23 April.43 At the same time, 
battalion machine gunners attempted to lay down 
suppressive fire with their Colt guns while the 
rifle platoons moved forward.44 The battalion’s 
initial advance conformed to guidelines indicated 
in Rapid Training of a Company for War, which 
outlined the techniques of fire and movement as 
“the need for covering fire, (a) of one company or 
platoon covering with its fire the advance of its 
neighbours,” and “(b) of special detachments of 
infantry posted, if possible, on a flank.”45 Birchall, 
author of the training manual, made sure that 
his troops were familiar with these techniques. 
Eyewitness accounts confirm the “leap-frogging” 
described by Duguid; according to Private Albert 
Adams of “B” Company, he and his fellows would 
advance about 25 yards at a time, taking cover 
intermittently.
 Anyone who visits the battlefield today can 
easily observe that the Germans enjoyed full 
advantages of terrain. The ground is very flat 
and, in early 1915, would not yet have been 
shelled into the interminable quagmire so often 
associated with the Ypres Salient during the later 
war years. As Private Frank Betts noted shortly 
after participating in the action, the battlefield 
was “as level as a billiard table.”46 A sketch map 
of the field drawn by someone from 1st Battalion 
shows that willow trees bisected the battlefield, 
and soldiers’ letters speak of hiding behind 
hedges prior to advancing, but this vegetation 
offered little cover once the assault troops passed 
the middle of the battlefield.47 From that point 
northward the ground rises almost imperceptibly 
up to the crest of Mauser Ridge. The difference 
in elevation is only really noticeable as one 
descends along the Pilckem road, but clearly 
the Germans were able to look down upon the 
vulnerable attackers and fire at will from their 
well-constructed “loop-holed” positions.48 
 It is tempting to criticize Birchall for 
launching the attack without having contacted the 
French on his left flank and without a preparatory 
bombardment. Yet Birchall had orders to attack 
and the message logs show that the Canadian 
force was expected to cooperate fully with its 
Anglo-French counterparts. As far as Birchall 
knew, the British and French forces on his flanks 
were also going to participate as planned. In 
the face of uncertainty about French intentions 
Birchall could only delay for so long, as precious 
minutes of darkness were running out with the 
approach of dawn on the morning of 23 April. As 
the sky grew lighter Birchall faced a conundrum 
experienced by countless other battalion 
commanders throughout the First World War: 
go, wait, or stay put? With time running short, 
clear orders from above, and the understanding 
that the Salient was in grave danger, it is not 
difficult to understand Birchall’s decision to 
advance. Nor was this a case of the stereotypical 
hide-bound commander thoughtlessly ordering 
his troops forward to meet certain death. 
Birchall lead the attack personally, and then 
assumed responsibility for “C” Company when its 
commander was incapacitated. In a letter home 
Frank Betts wrote:
I suppose you saw in the papers about the 4th 
(Battalion). Our Col. Birchall was killed. He sure 
was a brave man. He went up the field just as if 
there was not a war on, and the bullets, shrapnel, 
Johnsons and war shells were as thick as hail…49
Like so many of his soldiers, Birchall’s decision 
cost him his life, but it is difficult to conceive a 
better course of action he might have taken under 
the circumstances of 0530 hours, 23 April 1915.
 The search for blame inevitably turns next 
to commanders at brigade, division and beyond, 
for ordering a “suicidal” frontal attack and for 
failing to properly liaise with flanking units. The 
former criticism has been levelled against British 
and French commanders many times during 
the last 80 years, but once again, the reader 
is challenged to come up with an alternative 
course of action under the circumstances. With 
most of Belgium already occupied, Ypres was 
an important political symbol for the Allies, 
particularly since the British Expeditionary Force 
had made its stand there back in the autumn 
of 1914. Strategically, Ypres was a gateway to 
the channel ports that needed to be defended 
in order to protect British supply routes. Allied 
leaders elected to stand their ground and senior 
commanders were compelled to function within 
these parameters. As the German attack gained 
ground under a cloud of chlorine gas, hints 
of panic appeared in the Allied ranks. It was 
deemed necessary to counterattack, throw the 
enemy off balance, and gain time to reinforce. 
Senior officers did their best to re-shape plans 
in this fluid situation. Thus, there was no 
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demand from above that Birchall carry through 
the initial assault at all costs once it had gone 
to ground before reaching its objective. When 
Canadian Divisional headquarters learned of the 
high losses that Birchall’s force was suffering, it 
ordered 1st Brigade to dig in and await further 
reinforcement. After receiving these orders from 
brigade, Birchall and Hill acted accordingly.
 The issue of liaison is more problematic. With 
Canadian, British and French units operating 
side by side in a relatively contained space, the 
coordination of effort posed a special challenge. 
Cooperation between Canadian and British 
formations was facilitated to some degree by the 
fact that Alderson’s Canadians were part of the 
British chain of command. While the experiences 
of 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades in 
Top: The Poperinge Old Cemetery, located a few kilometers west of Ypres, is the resting place of some of the Canadians 
killed at the Second Battle of Ypres. Inset left: 26-year-old Private I.H. Murray of Moncton, NB died sometime between 
23 and 30 April 1915.  He is buried in Essex Farm Cemetery, only a few metres from Dr. John McCrae’s dressing station 
on the west side of the Yser Canal. Inset centre: Private G. Harrison was a 35-year-old veteran of the South African 
War who was killed on 23 April 1915. He is buried in Poperinge Old Cemetery.  Inset right: Lieutenant H.B. McGuire, 
of Orangeville, ON, died of wounds on 24 April 1915 and is buried in Poperinge Old Cemetery.
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the Second Battle of Ypres show that relations 
between Canadians and their British cousins 
were not always completely harmonious, it 
appears that 1st and 4th Battalions operated well 
in conjunction with the various British regiments 
behind them and to their right, including the 
Middlesex and the Buffs. 
 The situation on the Canadians’ left was far 
less secure. Not only was the flank left open to 
attack by the Germans, but the absence of any 
French activity between the Pilckem Road the 
Yser Canal allowed the Germans to concentrate 
their fire against the Canadian battalions. The 
message logs repeatedly state that contact existed 
with “French headquarters,” but there is nothing 
more specific to indicate which unit or echelon 
of command these headquarters belonged to. 
Throughout most of his final few hours Birchall 
was out of touch with what forces existed on 
his left flank and the accuracy of information 
on French strengths and dispositions coming 
from Mercer’s and Alderson’s headquarters is 
questionable at best. If liaison between front 
line units had been more securely established 
before dawn, it is possible that the attack might 
have succeeded in reaching the German line. But 
the Canadians had been marching all night to 
reach their lines and time was short. Language 
barriers exacerbated tenuous liaison, and there 
was simply not time for Birchall to personally 
confirm what his superiors told him to be true. 
Such action on his part may have delayed the 
counterattack until nightfall, which would have 
given the Germans more than 12 additional 
hours to bring supplies forward and strengthen 
their new defences on top of the ridge. 
 Costly experiences such as those of 1st 
and 4th Battalions at Second Ypres have too 
often been interpreted as evidence that the 
“unprepared” Canadian Expeditionary Force had 
much to learn before it would become the elite 
Dominion shock force of 1917-1918. Yet this 
analysis of operations on 23 April 1915 suggests 
that factors such as time, terrain, liaison, the 
introduction of chemical weapons, perceptions 
of enemy intentions, strategic considerations, 
and emergency circumstances conspired against 
Canadian soldiers in their first serious encounter 
with the enemy. Conversely, the training that 
Birchall and Hill’s men had received in England 
and France probably saved them from falling 
into chaos and being completely destroyed in 
the open. The soldiers of 1st Brigade were well-
trained by 1915 standards, and it is doubtful 
that any other two battalions could have achieved 
more than the 1st and 4th Canadians. Lessons 
were absorbed at Second Ypres, but there was 
no secret formula that could save battalions from 
suffering high casualties or painlessly overcome 
the myriad challenges posed by Western Front 
battlefield environments between 1914 and 1918. 
The Second Battle of Ypres was an unforgiving 
introduction to combat for the men of 1st and 
4th Canadian Infantry Battalions. The battles of 
1916, 1917 and 1918 were not going to get any 
easier. 
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